The Need for Operational and Cyber Resilience in Transportation Systems

January 14, 2016

Dr. Nader Mehravari, MBCP, MBCI

Cyber Risk and Resilience Management Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University nmehravari@sei.cmu.edu http://www.cert.org/resilience/





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Software Engineering Institute (SEI)

- Federally funded research and development center • based at Carnegie Mellon University
- Basic and applied research in partnership with ٠ government and private organizations
- Helps organizations improve development, ٠ operation, and management of software-intensive and networked systems

CERT Division – Anticipating and solving our nation's cybersecurity challenges

- Largest technical program at SEI
- Focused on internet security, secure systems, operational resilience, and coordinated response to security issues




Cyber Risk & Resilience Management Team

Engaged in

- Applied research
- Education & training
- Putting into practice
- Enabling our federal, state, and commercial partners

In areas dealing with

- Resilience Management
- Operation Risk Management
- Cyber and Resilience Frameworks
- Integration of cybersecurity, business continuity, & disaster recovery





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Cyber-Induced Operational Stress on Transportation Sector

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Summary



What do you see here?



A set of well looking evergreens.



Look Again!




A tree under operational stress



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Operational Stress





Examples of **Cyber-Induced Operational Stress** on **Transportation Sector**



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July 2015



SUBSCRIB





August 2015



THE NEXT TIME you press your wireless key fob to unlock your car, if you find that it doesn't beep until the second try, the issue may not be a technical glitch. Instead, a hacker like Samy Kamkar may be using a clever radio hack to intercept and record your wireless key's command. And when that hacker walks up to your vehicle a few minutes, hours, or days later, it won't even take those two button presses to get inside.



August 2015





\equiv **THE VERGE**

Researchers wirelessly hack a Corvette's brakes using an insurance dongle

The company has patched the fix, but the hack could be used on other cars



January 2008



The	A Register®			
Data Center Sof	tware Networks Security Business Hardware Science Bootnotes Video			
SECURITY				
Polish teen derails tram after hacking train network Turns city network into Hornby set				
By John Leyden, 11 Jan 2008 Follow 3,007 followers				
	A Polish teenager allegedly turned the tram system in the city of Lodz into his or personal train set, triggering chaos and derailing four vehicles in the process. In people were injured in one of the incidents.			



January 2012







September 2012



G f У in 🛛

Home » Technology » Software » September 23, 2012

ORG

Not fare: Hacker app resets subway card for free rides

Sep 23, 2012 by Nancy Owano report

PHYS

They tested the app's success on two transit systems, New Jersey Path and San Francisco Muni trains. Benninger and Sobell said that other systems might be vulnerable to such an <u>exploit</u>, in the form of an Android application that could make it possible for holders of a card to get free rides in Boston, Seattle, <u>Salt Lake City</u>, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Those other systems were not tested by the researchers,



December 2015





Home > SCADA / ICS



Trains Vulnerable to Hacker Attacks: Researchers

By Eduard Kovacs on December 29, 2015



CERT | 🏯 Software Engi

LI UBNEL

Tengelo ve movie and other

October 2013



To Move Drugs, Traffickers Are Hacking Shipping Containers

October 21, 2013 // 06:45 PM CET



The port of Antwerp. Flickr (Dominic Sommers)

The scheme sounds like a work of near science fiction. But police in the Netherlands and Belgium insist its true, and say they have the evidence to prove it: two tons of cocaine and heroin, a machine gun, a suitcase stuffed with \$1.7 million, and hard drive cases turned into hacking devices.



Coast Guard official: Cyber incidents with physical consequences impacting the maritime


FierceGovernmentIT

Topics: Cybersecurity | Military/DoD and Space | Oversight

October 2015

transportation system

October 13, 2015 | By Molly Bernhart Walker



NEWS TO











Cyber-attack concerns raised over Boeing 787 chip's 'back door'

Researchers claim chip used in military systems and civilian aircraft has built-in function that could let in hackers







WIRED GEAR SCIENCE ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESS SECURITY

Hacked X-Rays Could Slip Guns Past Airport Security

BY KIM ZETTER 02.11.14 6:30 AM

PUNTA CANA, Dominican Republic — Could a threat-simulation feature found in airport around the country be subverted to mask weapons or other contraband hidden in a trac

The answer is yes, according to two security researchers with a history of discovering systems, who purchased their own x-ray control machine online and spent months analy workings.

The researchers, Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle, say the so-called Threat Image Project someday backfire.



August 2014


















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Discussion is Applicable to All Subsectors





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Discussion is Applicable to...

Transportation Subsectors	Primary Units of Transportation	Modes of Transportation
Aviation	People & Goods	Air
Highway Infrastructure & Motor Carrier	People & Goods	Ground
Maritime Transportation Systems	People & Goods	Sea
Mass Transit & Passenger Rail	People	Ground
Pipeline Systems	Oil & Gas	Ground
Freight Rail	Goods	Ground
Postal & Shipping	Mailpieces & Goods	Air, Ground, Sea



Prevention is Futile





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
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Cyber Intrusions are a Fact of Life




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Traditional Information Security Function





Operational and Cyber Resilience





An Operationally Resilient Entity?



A tree under operational stress... ...while achieving its "business" mission



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Operational Resilience

The *emergent* property of an entity

 that can continue to carry out its mission in the presence of operational stress and disruption that does not exceed its limit

The ability of an entity to

- Prevent disruptions from occurring;
- And when struck by a disruption, the ability to quickly respond to and recover from a disruption in the primary business processes.



Sample Techniques for Improving and Managing Cyber Resilience



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Organizational Aspects


How should **organizational structures**, **roles**, **and responsibilities** be adapted?

Example:

• "Traditional" vs. "Modern" information security functions



Modern Information Security Functions





Operational Risk Aspects


How should organizations adapt their overall **operational risk management principles and practices**?

Example:

Integration and convergence of operational risk management activities.




Today's Operational Risk Management





Desired Solution Approach



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CERT

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Tools and Techniques Aspects

What structured (i.e., not ad hoc) **frameworks** could guide and assist organizations?

Example:

Resilience Management Model



What is Resilience Management Model?

Framework for managing and improving operational resilience


Guides implementation, mgmt, and sustainment of operational risk management activities

Improves confidence in how an organization manages and responds to operational stress

Focuses on "What" not "How"

Applicable to a variety of organizations

- small or large
- simple or complex
- public or private



"...an extensive superset of the things an organization could do to be more resilient."

- CERT-RMM adopter



A Sampling of RMM Success Stories






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In Closing




Sampling of ITS Emerging Capabilities



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Commonalities in Emerging Capabilities



Information Technology


&

Communication Technology



43

Primary Risks to Common Elements





Cyber Risk Mitigation Challenge

Traditional IT cybersecurity contingencies are not feasible

- Failover over to a disaster recovery site
- Restoring from backup
- Failover to another vehicle
- Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) timeframes precludes "Patch Tuesdays."
- Can't call a breach response team (AAA does not do that yet)

Successful management of cyber risk within ITS may require a (significant) shift in thinking and approach.



Promising and Proven Approach





Thank you for your attention.

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